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ON THE SECOND BOOK OF ARISTOTLE'S POETICS AND THE SOURCE OF THEOPHRASTUS' DEFINITION OF TRAGEDY

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I. THE TRADITION OF A LOST SECOND BOOK OF THE POETICS¹

SINCE the Renaissance any treatment of Aristotle's *Poetics* has discussed and lamented the loss of a second book. Because this book, as we shall see, is supposed to have contained a theory of comedy, its loss, measured by the value of the Aristotelian theory of tragedy, is incalculable. An attempt to investigate the facts on which the belief in this loss is based, and to determine its reliability is, therefore, of fundamental importance.

The belief rests on the observation that the *Poetics*, as it is now constituted, is incomplete, or rather fails to fulfill its apparent programme, being especially deficient in a symmetrical elaboration of its initial divisions. Such incompleteness is usually defined as the lack of an entire second book.

I

A direct statement that there were two books is to be found in the list of Aristotle's works given by Diogenes Laertius in his life of the philosopher.² By this evidence, Bywater holds,³ "the fact is sufficiently assured," although "we have no further direct testimony to the existence of a Second Book." There is, however, the statement of the so-called Anonymus Menagii, to be identified probably with

¹ The materials in this article formed part of a dissertation, *The Mediaeval Conception of Comedy and Tragedy*, submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Ph.D. at Harvard University in 1916. I am under obligations for suggestions and help, to Professors C. N. Jackson, W. H. Schofield, and especially to Professor E. K. Rand.

² V. Rose, *Aristotelis qui ferebantur librorum fragmenta* (Teubner), Leipzig, 1886, p. 6, l. 83.

³ Ingram Bywater, *Aristotle on the Art of Poetry*, Oxford, 1909, p. xx.

Hesychius,¹ where two books are mentioned.² This evidence is also accepted by von Christ as establishing the existence of the second book.³ In the third place, there is the additional testimony of the only other early index of Aristotle's works, in the "fragments of a philosopher of Ptolemy's reign," where there is mention of two books "de arte poetica secundum disciplinam Pythagorae eiusque sectatorum placita."⁴ This is explained by Wenrich,⁵ and accepted by Rose,⁶ as being a confusion between Aristotle's two books of the *Poetics* and a work on Pythagoras, but nevertheless corroborating the evidence of the other two lists.

Zeller cites the evidence of all three lists to prove that the *Poetics* as we have it is only a fragment.⁷ The relation of the three is declared by Rose⁸ to be as follows: Andronicus made a list of the works of Aristotle in his books on the Aristotelian philosophy; an unknown philosopher of the time of Ptolemy did the same, with certain changes, but using the same basis; Favorinus then derived from Andronicus in his commentaries, upon which Diogenes and also Hesychius relied.

2

Although the direct assertions of the existence of two books are comparatively few, many statements indicate that there were more than one. Most important in this class of evidence is, of course, that to be found in the other works of the philosopher, especially in the *Rhetoric*. In all of these the definite article is used in the plural when reference is made to the *Poetics*.

In the first book of the *Rhetoric* Aristotle refers to the books of the *Poetics* for a discussion of the ridiculous.⁹ In the third book of the *Rhetoric*, again with apparent reference to the ridiculous, a treatment

¹ E. Zeller, *Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics*, trans. from *Philosophy of the Greeks* by B. F. C. Costelloe and J. H. Muirhead, 2 vols., London, 1897, i, p. 48, n. 3.

² Rose, *Fragm.*, pp. 13, 75.

³ W. von Christ, *Geschichte der griechischen Litteratur*, 5th ed., W. Schmid, Munich, 1908, i, p. 702, n. 4.

⁴ V. Rose, *Aristoteles Pseudepigraphus*, Leipzig, 1863, pp. 79, 80.

⁵ J. G. Wenrich, *De Auctorum Graecorum versionibus . . . commentariis commentatio*, Leipzig, 1842, p. 143.

⁶ Rose, *Arist. Pseud.*, p. 194.

⁷ Zeller, *op. cit.*, i, p. 102, n. 2.

⁸ Rose, *op. cit.*, pp. 8 ff.

⁹ *Rhetoric*, I, 11, 1371 B 33.

of that subject is omitted on the ground that it already exists in the books of the *Poetics*.¹ In the same part of the *Rhetoric* a cross-reference is given to the books of the *Poetics* — to chapter 22, so Jebb believes.² A little later in this section another reference is made to the books of the *Poetics* — chapter 21 according to Jebb.³ A few paragraphs further on, another reference is made, for a treatment of diction, to the books of the *Poetics*, corresponding, like the two immediately preceding, to chapters 21 and 22.⁴ In still another place we have a reference, like that in the first, to the books of the *Poetics* for a treatment of the ridiculous.⁵

In the *Politics*, also, Aristotle, speaking of the term *κάθαρσις* promises to discuss it more fully in the books on *Poetics*.⁶ The evidence presented by all this testimony is certainly of great weight.

Besides the indications of Aristotle's own works we have the implications of some of the early commentators on the philosopher. Ammonius, probably of the fifth century, in his work on the *De Interpretatione*, refers to the *Poetics* in the plural.⁷ This comment is taken by Vahlen to refer to chapter 20,⁸ and is cited by Zeller⁹ to support the tradition of a lost book.

Boethius also treated the *De Interpretatione*, translating it once with a commentary in two books, and again, about 507, with a fuller commentary in six books.¹⁰ In the second work he mentions "Aristoteles in libris quos de poetica scripsit,"¹¹ which is taken by Zeller to mean that Boethius knew a *Poetics* in two books.¹²

¹ *Rhetoric*, 3, 1, 1404 A 39.

² *Rhetoric*, 3, 2, 1404 B 5; R. C. Jebb, *The Rhetoric of Aristotle*, ed. J. E. Sandys, Cambridge, 1909.

³ *Rhetoric*, 3, 2, 1404 B 26.

⁵ *Rhetoric*, 3, 18, 1419 B 2.

⁴ *Rhetoric*, 3, 2, 1404 B 37.

⁶ *Politics*, 8, 1341 B 39.

⁷ A. Brandis, *Scholia in Aristotelem* (*Aristotelis Opera*, iv), Berlin, 1836, p. 99 A 12; A. Busse, *Ammonii in Aristotelis de Interpretatione Commentarium*, I, Berlin, 1897, p. 13, 1.

⁸ J. Vahlen, *Aristotelis de Arte Poetica Liber*, 3d ed., Leipzig, 1885, note on *Poetics*, 20, 1456 B 25 (p. 45).

⁹ Zeller, *op. cit.*, i, p. 102, n. 2.

¹⁰ J. E. Sandys, *A History of Classical Scholarship from the Sixth Century B. C. to the End of the Middle Ages*, Cambridge, 1906, i, p. 253.

¹¹ Boethius, *Commentarii in librum Aristotelis ΗΕΠΙ ΕΡΜΗΝΕΙΑΣ* (Pars posterior secundam editionem continens), ed. C. Meiser, pp. 6, 11 ff.: in libris quos de poetica scripsit locutionis partes esse syllabas vel etiam coniunctiones tradidit, etc."

¹² Zeller, *op.*, p. 102, n. 2.

The commentator Eustratius is appealed to by Bywater¹ as showing "that there was even in the latest Aristotelian schools some faint tradition of another Book," for, in his work on the *Ethics*, he speaks of a first book of the *Poetics*, and this may be taken to mean that there was also another, a second book.

Finally, the fragments of an early anonymous commentator on the *Rhetoric* employ the plural when asserting that Aristotle discussed the ridiculous in the *Poetics*.² The evidence on this score is presented by Vahlen³ in a series of quotations that refer to Aristotle's treatment of the ridiculous. The words of the anonymous writer thus prove, according to Ritter, that Aristotle's work *On Poets*, which was in three books, was different from the *Poetics* in two.⁴

3

There are in Aristotle and elsewhere grounds for believing that certain matters spoken of as treated in the *Poetics*, but not found there now, were once to be read in a second book. These references also indicate an order of the works, according to Ritter⁵ and others, who think that the composition of the *Poetics* is spoken of as a future work not only in *Politics* 8, 1341 B 39, but also in the *De Interpretatione* 4, 17 A 5.

At any rate, in the passages of the *Rhetoric* which we have already cited, the philosopher apparently referred to the work as one already done. The close relation in general between the *Rhetoric* and the *Poetics* is further established by the large number of correspondences of different sorts noted by Vahlen.⁶

Nevertheless, the explanation of katharsis to which the eighth book of the *Politics* looks forward does not appear to be sufficiently given in *Poetics*, 6, 2, where the word occurs only in the definition.⁷

There is no treatment of the ridiculous such as we should expect from various statements in the *Rhetoric* (1, 11, 1372 A 1; 3, 1, 1404 A 39; 3, 18, 1419 B 2). Thus, of the references to the *Poetics* in the

¹ Bywater, *op. cit.*, p. xxi.

² Spengel, *Aristotelis Ars Rhetorica*, Leipzig, 1867, i, 159, 15.

³ Vahlen, *op. cit.*, p. 77.

⁴ F. Ritter, *Aristotelis Poetica*, Cologne, 1839, p. xi.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. vi.

⁶ Vahlen, *op. cit.*, pp. 49 ff., pp. 53 ff.

⁷ *Poetics*, 6, 1449 B 24.

Rhetoric, one-half find some counterpart, while there is nothing at all corresponding to the other.¹ Ritter decides such inconsistencies compel us to conclude that either Aristotle does not mean our *Poetics* in these passages of the *Rhetoric*, or else the *Poetics* as we have it (*Poeticam nostram*) "mancam ad nos temporum hominumque iniuria pervenisse."²

In the *Poetics* itself there is a pledge that is not redeemed to the satisfaction of readers, where Aristotle says that "we shall speak later about Comedy."³ It is natural to suppose that the treatment of the ridiculous as the basis of comedy would have been found in the part of the *Poetics* which discussed comedy, and that if neither the promise of the *Rhetoric* nor that of the *Poetics* was kept, the reason would be the same: namely, the loss of the second book in which both were contained. The deficiency is explained on that basis by Gercke,⁴ following Rose;⁵ and Bywater, in his footnote on *Poetics* 6, 1449 B 21, supplements Aristotle's words with the phrase "in the lost Second Book of the *Poetics*."⁶ Thus Bywater is enabled to outline the contents of the second book as containing a further treatment of katharsis, and a discussion of comedy, in which the laughable would have been analysed as corresponding to the pitiful and the terrible in tragedy.⁷

4

The exposition of some other matters would probably have found a place in such a second book, according to most critics: in particular, certain aspects of the subject of comic diction to which there exist apparently two references; and, much more important, a defence of the drama against the censures of Plato.

In his commentary on the *Categories*, Simplicius quotes Aristotle on the subject of synonyms.⁸ That this topic also stood in the second book

¹ E. M. Cope, *The Rhetoric of Aristotle*, ed. J. E. Sandys, Cambridge, 1877, i, p. 224; J. E. C. Welldon, *The Rhetoric of Aristotle*, London, 1886, p. 85.

² Ritter, *op. cit.*, p. vii.

³ *Poetics*, 6, 1449 B 21.

⁴ Gercke, "Aristoteles," Pauly-Wissowa, *Real-Encyclopädie*, ii, 1, col. 1053. 27.

⁵ v. Rose, *De Aristotelis Librorum Ordine et Auctoritate Commentatio*, Berlin, 1854, p. 133.

⁶ Bywater, *Art of Poetry*, p. 149.

⁷ Bywater, *op. cit.*, p. xxiii.

⁸ A. Brandis, *Scholια*, p. 43 A 13; Kalbfleisch, *Simplicii in Aristotelis Categorias Commentarium*, Berlin, 1907, p. 36, 13.

is a supposition to which both Bywater¹ and Vahlen² incline by placing it among the fragments on comedy immediately succeeding their texts of the extant *Poetics*.

The other reference is a puzzle presented by a statement in the lexicon of the anonymous compiler, called the Antiatticist, published by Bekker, which may derive in part from Orus,³ whom Ritschl placed as early as the second century of our era, while Reitzenstein assigns him to the fifth century. The Antiatticist, in defending the use of the word *κυνρότατον*, cites Aristotle in the *Poetics*.⁴ The portion of the *Poetics* proper to this definition was, according to Bywater,⁵ the lost second book.

A defence of the drama against Plato⁶ would have been a feature of absorbing interest in this lost second book. In Aristotle's *Poetics*, as Spingarn observes,⁷ scholars of the Renaissance discovered a satisfactory vindication of the claims of poetry against the Platonic and mediaeval objections. In Plato the objections were grounded in a metaphysical theory of imitation, interpreted, some would hold, in a narrow spirit. Since he conceived imitation as mere copying, and since he held to the theory of the objectivity of ideas, he allowed little scope for the representative arts.⁸ If an object in nature is only a comparatively unreal copy of an eternal objective reality in God, the reproduction of that object in art is twice removed from reality, and if certainly false probably dangerous also.

After all, the matter is not entirely settled by the answer of Aristotle with respect to tragedy. Plato's objection to the drama as exciting the passions without providing a means of governing them is not fully

¹ Bywater, *op. cit.*, p. 93.

² Vahlen, *op. cit.*, p. 81.

³ Sandys, *op. cit.*, i, p. 325.

⁴ Cf. Vahlen, *op. cit.*, p. 81; *Antiatticista in Bekkeri anecdotis*, 101, 32 *κυνρότατον*: 'Αριστοτέλης περί ποιητικῆς. "τὸ δὲ πάντων κυνρότατον."

⁵ Bywater, *op. cit.*, p. xxiii.

⁶ The relations of Aristotle in the *Poetics* to Plato have been well treated, with results clearly demonstrating the dependence of Aristotle on his master, in: Ch. Belger, *De Aristotele etiam in Arte Poetica componenda Platonis discipulo*, Diss., Berlin, 1872; Georg Finsler, *Platon und die Aristotelische Poetik*, Leipzig, 1900.

⁷ J. E. Spingarn, *A History of Literary Criticism in the Renaissance*, 2d ed., New York, 1908, pp. 18, 19.

⁸ B. Bosanquet, *A History of Aesthetic*, London, 1904, pp. 47-55.

refuted by Aristotle's theory of katharsis, as it is usually interpreted. It meets the Platonic objection only so far as it is probable that the possible vicarious aesthetic satisfaction without an inevitable impulse to moral action will find compensation in the generalizing character of genuine tragedy, which is one of its inherently moral functions. That is, tragedy gives occasion for a proper conception of life, and may thus issue forth in proper actions. But it is still possible for the passions to be aroused without finding a direct and immediate reaction appropriate to the character of the passions aroused and at the same time morally profitable. Clearer intellectual perception is not inevitably succeeded by improved ethical practice, and so James urges us never to allow ourselves an aesthetic excitation of emotion without a deliberately beneficial consequence in our actions.¹

Whatever may be the correct theory of the effect of comedy on the spectators, the Platonic objections apply, it would appear, much more to comedy than to tragedy, and were in fact urged against it in the first place rather than against tragedy.

That a discussion of all the objections raised by Plato, with definite refutation of them, clearing away the difficulties just mentioned, was included in the *Poetics* is the judgment of many scholars. Although Vahlen opposed the theory, urged by Heitz, that this treatment was to be found in the lost ending of the *Politics*, he supposed that it was contained in a lost final chapter of the *Poetics*. Bernays, however, held that it was in the lamented second book, — a reasonable conclusion in view of the other arguments urged for the existence of that book.²

5

Victorius,³ the first great editor of the *Poetics*, was, as Bywater notes,⁴ the first to say that our *Poetics* is only part of a larger work. This opinion grew steadily; Zeller states it specifically as the loss of a second book, supporting his opinion with much of the evidence cited above.⁵ Rose, in his work to determine the canon of Aristotle, finally

¹ W. James, *Principles of Psychology*, New York, 1890, ii, chapters 24 and 25.

² Finsler, *Platon*, p. 3.

³ Vettori (P.) (Victorius), *Commentationes in primum librum Aristotelis de Arte Poetarum*, Florence, 1560.

⁴ Bywater, *op. cit.*, p. xx.

⁵ Zeller, *op. cit.*, i, p. 102, n. 2.

listed the *Poetics* as having consisted of two books,¹ and Spengel also thought that there must have been two books.² In this supposition he was in accord with his usual opponent Bernays, who even asserted that in another treatise we still possess certain fragments of the second book's treatment of comedy.³ Most recently of all, Bywater has felt justified in drawing up a sketch of the contents of the second book.⁴

The loss may be partly explained by the orthodox tradition of the vicissitudes of Aristotle's manuscripts. Sulla, according to this account, after quelling the revolt of Apellicon, carried off his library, which contained Aristotle's autographs that had already languished in the cave at Skepsis for a considerable period. Sulla entrusted these parchments to Tyrannion, and thus the edition of Andronicus was prepared.⁵ If these incidents are accurately reported, especially the story of the unique manuscripts in the cave at Skepsis, these books ran great risks of destruction or neglect. As it is, there exists a total gap in the history of all the Aristotelian writings for a full century after Cicero. This is certainly due to the entire loss of all the commentaries of that period,⁶ and a like fate may easily be assigned to the second book in case it survived previous perils. Rose argues that it was lost at a very early date since it was not known to the Arabs, Syrians, or other commentators, and must have perished before Andronicus, from whom he would date the present state of the text.⁷

Bernays, however, believes that the second book survived until the fifth century, chiefly because he finds at that time in Proclus a conception of katharsis, corresponding to his own deductions from Plato and Aristotle on the question, with which he overthrew the neo-classical doctrine in favor of a more psychological solution.⁸ Hatz-

¹ Rose, *De Arist. Libr. Ord.*, p. 241.

² H. Düntzer, "Die Aristotelische Poetik und ihr Verhältniss zu den Büchern *Περὶ Ποικύλων*," *Zeitschrift für die Alterthumswissenschaft* (1842), pp. 280, 281.

³ J. Bernays, *Zwei Abhandlungen über die Aristotelische Theorie des Drama*, Berlin, 1880. (I. Grundzüge der verlorenen Abhandlung des Aristoteles über Wirkung der Tragödie; II. Ergänzung zu Aristoteles' Poetik.)

⁴ Bywater, *op. cit.*, p. xxiii.

⁵ R. Shute, *On the History of the Process by which the Aristotelian Writings Arrived at their Present Form*, Oxford, 1888, pp. 47, 48.

⁶ *Op. cit.*, p. 66.

⁷ Rose, *De Arist. Libr. Ord.*, p. 133.

⁸ Bywater, *op. cit.*, p. xxi.

feld and Dufour go so far as to make the loss relatively recent,¹ because “c’est dans le second livre de cet ouvrage que les commentateurs alexandrins ont puisé la substance de leurs gloses sur les poètes comiques grecs et de leurs traités ‘*de la comédie*.’ ”

II. THE TRADITION OF A SECOND BOOK CRITICISED

The existence of a second book, assumed to be lost, cannot, in the nature of the case be absolutely disproved. By the logic of such a situation a universal negative cannot be absolutely proved even of contemporary facts. With the increase in distance from the time of the facts considered the difficulty is immensely increased. No amount of rational consideration applied to a complete collection of the available facts surrounding the point at issue — facts relatively few after so long a time — could guarantee the truth of its conclusions. Palimpsests from some remote eastern monastery, or the accidental find of some archaeologist in Egypt could easily overthrow the perfect theory of an investigator. It is the obligation of scholars, however, to erect such frail structures, based on a conscientious survey of all the evidence, with the humble reservation in every case, that the very paucity of the evidence must leave the structure frail. Thus, in a question of the kind we are considering, it is possible to weigh the value of the evidence and to judge the tradition which asserts that there was a second book of the *Poetics*. Then, while we are, by the conditions of the problem prevented from making a categorical denial, we can, I feel sure, assert that sufficient reason cannot be shown to warrant the belief that such a book ever existed. All the conditions of the problem are more completely satisfied, on the basis of existing evidence, by the hypothesis that there was no second book of the *Poetics*.

I

To begin with, the whole tradition depends too largely on the evidence of the indices, the value of which, under the scrutiny of close criticism, can be shown to be only limited.

¹ A. Hatzfeld and M. Dufour, *La Poétique d'Aristote*, Lille, 1899, p. vii.

That Andronicus did make a list may be accepted without hesitation¹ on the evidence of Porphyry in his life of Plotinus.² That these *πίνακες* were copied in turn by Favorinus, from whom Diogenes Laertius obtained his list, is the theory of scholars as different as Rose and Bernays, whereas Shute holds that these inferences can be disproved.³ There is a great gulf between admitting that Andronicus did make a list, and that the lists we have reproduce him, especially when there is grave doubt about their intrinsic value, and whether their authorship cannot with safety be assigned to another ancient scholar.

It is hard on general principles to believe that the lack of order and arrangement in Diogenes's list could have been the result of the otherwise admirable scholarship of Andronicus.⁴ The weight of evidence shows rather that there is probably no relation between the index compiled by Andronicus and the one furnished by Diogenes.⁵

In the first place, although Diogenes cites Aristotle frequently, he does not follow his own list, but by implication appears to have used the same canon as his predecessors and contemporaries.⁶ How could he refer to the third book of the *Poetics*, when he had already said in his list that there were two?⁷ Indeed, Diogenes's list contains comparatively few works, among his lengthy enumerations of titles, that we can now accept as genuinely Aristotelian.⁸ On poetry alone Diogenes ascribes five separate treatises to Aristotle,⁹ and he seems elsewhere to have confused the *Poetics* and the dialogue *On Poets*.¹⁰ In him we see clearly the beginnings of the process by which, through including forgeries, variant editions of the same work, editions of separate portions of whole treatises bearing another title, pupils' notes, enlargements of later commentators, and other accretions, David the Armenian found a thousand different works ascribed to Aristotle in the libraries of the Ptolemies.¹¹

¹ Shute, *op. cit.*, p. 89.

² A. Kirchhoff, *Plotini Opera*, Leipzig, 1856, p. xxxix.

³ Shute, *op. cit.*, p. 86.

⁶ Shute, *op. cit.*, p. 90.

⁴ Shute, *op. cit.*, p. 80.

⁷ Ritter, *op. cit.*, p. x, n.

⁵ Zeller, *op. cit.*, i, p. 49.

⁸ Shute, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

⁹ Rose, *Fragm.* pp. 3 ff: 2, 83, 118, 119, 136.

¹⁰ Rose, *Fragm.*, p. 76; Diog. Laert., 8, 57. Cf. Diog. Laert., 3, 48 (pp. 77, 78), and 2, 46 (p. 79).

¹¹ Shute, *op. cit.*, p. 93.

The compiler of the list given by Diogenes, because of its inclusiveness, was probably an Alexandrine scholar.¹ In this conclusion most critics, except Rose,² agree, especially since Hermippus may be designated its author.³ A clue is afforded by Diogenes himself who, immediately before giving a list of the works of Theophrastus, cites Favorinus and distinctly states that the source of Favorinus was Hermippus.⁴ Since the origin of his list for Aristotle may have been similar, it would be easy to explain its character, whatever the additions by Favorinus or Diogenes, as merely a librarian's list of the titles borne by books in a library.

The works mentioned by ancient authors other than the compilers of these lists, however, generally correspond to what we now possess, and Cicero's statement of the range of Aristotle's works squares with our canon.⁵ Dionysius of Halicarnassus uses virtually the same text that we now have,⁶ and while Galen's canon is identical with ours except for a few lost works, the roll of the missing does not include a second book of the *Poetics*.⁷ Thus, while from the time of Cicero on, the successors of the editors Tyrannion and Andronicus refer to a uniform body of works nearly equivalent to our canon, of the works which Diogenes mentions, hardly any, except the dialogues, can be identified in the works we possess.⁸

The index of Hesychius is plainly, as Rose points out,⁹ only a copy of Diogenes, with the suppression of certain repeated titles, and the addition of some more names, as incapable of identification as of belief. Altogether Hesychius managed to accumulate thirteen different titles which might have had to do with poetry.¹⁰

The index of the unknown philosopher in the time of Ptolemy is at once dismissed by Bywater and most other recent critics.¹¹ Its devious

¹ Zeller, *op. cit.*, i, p. 51.

² Rose tries to maintain the patently inconsistent position that the Aristotelian works and canon were always just as we have them, and that we have them all.

³ Sandys, *op. cit.*, i, pp. 122 ff.

⁴ Shute, *op. cit.*, p. 92.

⁵ Shute, *op. cit.*, p. 51. Cf. Cicero, *De Fin.*, 5, 4, 9 ff.

⁶ Sandys, *op. cit.*, i, pp. 279 ff.; Shute, *op. cit.*, p. 67.

⁷ *Op. cit.*, p. 77.

⁸ *Op. cit.*, p. 86.

⁹ Rose, *Fragm.*, p. 11, n. 1.

¹⁰ *Op. cit.*, pp. 11 ff.

¹¹ Bywater, *op. cit.*, p. xx.

history and the evident consequences of frequent mistranslation make it practically negligible when the significance of the other lists has entirely disappeared.

2

We may now approach the question from another point of view. If various passages can be adduced to prove that there were two books of the *Poetics*, a number can also be brought forward in which one is assigned as the number of books in that work. Of course, it must be admitted in fairness, that the singular of the definite article has not the conclusive force possessed by the use of the plural. It is, indeed, possible to refer to the book of the *Poetics*, meaning the one which I have in mind, without asserting that there is only one book; but the use of the plural carries with it the inevitable consequence that there was more than one book, and not less than two. Yet, if the occurrences of the singular alone are sufficiently numerous and of value in themselves, their significance cannot be ignored.

Zeller cites Alexander Aphrodisiensis as using the expression ἐν τῷ περὶ ποιητικῆς which he takes to indicate that Alexander knew only one book.¹ Zeller, however, apparently did not examine the passage to note the confused reading. In the Berlin edition it was noticed that Alexander's reference in this same passage to the *Rhetoric* is to be found in the *Poetics* instead.² Following an emendation proposed by Vahlen, Wallies solved the difficulty by bracketing the reference to the *Poetics*, and allowing the mistaken reference to the *Rhetoric* to stand.³ We have here probably only a case where the original mistake of the author or an early copyist was corrected by a succeeding scribe, to creep in later along with the mistake. This passage, then, does not prove that Alexander knew only one book of the *Poetics*; rather, that some scribe of the third century or later, knew only one.

David the Armenian,⁴ probably in the fifth century, uses the singular in a passage where he speaks of other works by titles in the plural. Hermias,⁵ another pupil of Syrianus, was the father of Ammonius, the

¹ Zeller, *op. cit.*, i, p. 102, n. 2.

² IV, (*Scholia in Arist.*), 299 B 44.

³ Wallies, *Alexandri Aphrodisiensis in Aristotelis Sophisticos Elenchos Commentarium*, Berlin, 1898, pp. 33, 26.

⁴ Sandys, *op. cit.*, i, p. 76.

⁵ Vahlen, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

pupil of Proclus, and he uses the expression ἐν τῷ περὶ ποιητικῆς.¹ This is one of the pieces of evidence presented by Zeller to show a divergence of tradition.² Here we have an apparent difference of opinion even within a family of scholars, since Ammonius, the son, used the plural in spite of his father's singular. Hence Zeller's observation that the more ancient authorities were acquainted with two books and the modern with only one loses some of its force.

When Simplicius, in his reference to synonyms,³ speaks of *the* book, it may be that he vaguely recollected that some matters of diction were taken up in the *Poetics*. Whatever the value of his citation of Aristotle in this connection, it is clear that he thought of the *Poetics* as one book.

Disobedience to his father secured for Ammonius disloyalty in his own pupil Philoponus, for the latter agreed with his master's progenitor and used the singular.⁴

An Arabic commentator, Alfarabi,⁵ in the tenth century, also used the singular regarding the *Poetics*, but his allusion was mistaken.⁶

Eustratius, it will be remembered, was cited by Bywater to prove that when that author speaks of a first book of the *Poetics*, he implies there was a second. Now, as I shall show later, neither the titles nor the numbers of books have any definite meaning for us because of the absolutely conflicting statements with regard to them, so that no inference can be made from the title to the number or vice-versa, and thus the mention of a first book in connection with a work called the *Poetics* by no means proves that there was more than one book in the work we have agreed to call the *Poetics*. The only safe method is to see whether the content of a given quotation corresponds to the nature of the works we have agreed to call the *Poetics* — a technical treatise, — or to the work *On Poets* — a dialogue. Such examination of the com-

¹ F. Ast, *Platonis Phaedrus* (contains also the scholia of Hermias), Leipzig, 1810, p. III.

² Zeller, *op. cit.*, i, p. 102, n. 2.

³ *Op. cit.*, i, p. 102, n. 2.

⁴ Hayduck, *Ioannis Philoponi in Aristotelis De Anima Libros Commentaria*, Berlin, 1897, p. 269, l. 28.

⁵ Sandys, *op. cit.*, i, p. 395.

⁶ Vahlen, *op. cit.*, p. 3. "Alfarabius interprete Schmoeldersio docum. philos. Arabum p. 21, *de demonstratione omnino fallaci disseritur in ipsius libro de arte poetica.*"

plete passage to which Bywater refers shows clearly that it points to what we choose to call *On Poets*.¹ If the term *first* proves anything, it only shows that there was more than one book in either the *Poetics* or *On Poets*, and the balance of evidence inclines towards *On Poets*.

One of the citations, from an anonymous commentator on the *Rhetoric*, is used to prove the existence of a second book, but another commentator, also anonymous, in paraphrasing his passage of the *Rhetoric*, uses the singular of the *Poetics*.² Both had the text of the *Rhetoric* before them, but where our extant version has the plural, commentators could still vary when their works were composed.

3

In spite of the reasons brought forward to explain the loss of a second book of the *Poetics*, the difficulties in accounting for this disaster lead more easily to the conclusion that it never existed. The awkwardness of attempts to make the loss plausible become more apparent when it is recollected that the tradition assumes definite shape only since the time of Vettori. Thus Bywater says,³ "As for Book II, one thing is quite clear, that it was wanting in the common archetype of Σ, the MS. before the eighth century Syriac translator, and A°, our oldest Greek MS. We cannot fix the date of its disappearance; it is practically certain, however, that the loss must have occurred during the papyrus period of the text, when Book II was still on a separate roll, so as to be easily detached from Book I, which was on another roll."

Bywater, however, also acknowledges that there is no evidence to show that later grammarians had any information about the second book or the theory of comedy supposed to be contained in it, while there is, on the other hand, evidence to show that it was unknown to them. The history of the existing book in classical times is indeed obscure to the point of ignorance, and although Bywater thinks that much of the teaching of the *Poetics* and its terminology were repro-

¹ Heylbut, *Eustratii et Michaelis et Anonyma in Ethica Nicomachea Commentaria*, Berlin, 1892, p. 320, l. 36. Cf. Bywater, *op. cit.*, p. xxi.

² Rabe, *Anonymi et Stephani in Artem rhetoricam commentaria*, Berlin, 1896, p. 259. Cf. p. ix.

³ Bywater, *op. cit.*, p. xxi.

duced in the later literature of compilation,¹ the amount is at best small and comparatively late, so that the work must have been either ignored or little studied.

Neither Dionysius of Halicarnassus nor Quintilian knew the *Poetics* at all,² and Bywater confesses that in Byzantine times the second book was completely forgotten.³ Strabo, who flourished at about the same time as Dionysius, has nothing to say about Aristotle which can be verified, not excepting his story of the Aristotelian library; and he does not mention the *Poetics*.⁴

There is, indeed, a passage in Themistius that Vahlen quotes in his footnote to *Poetics* 3, 1448 A 33,⁵ which seems to parallel Aristotle, at least as far as the coupling of the names of Epicharmus and Phormis is concerned. In this passage of the *Poetics*, however, as in some other ancient writers,⁶ the Sicilian origin of comedy is asserted. In 5, 1449 B 6, the names of Epicharmus and Phormis are joined in this same connection. The names, however, were bracketed in the text by Susemihl and succeeding scholars, and the reconstruction of the passage, clearly ungrammatical, was effected with the aid of Themistius.⁷ While this process may be interesting in the annotation of Aristotle, it does not go far in proving that Themistius derived his knowledge from the *Poetics*, or that it was known to him.

Vahlen also quotes a passage from one of the scholia on Dionysius Thrax to parallel *Poetics* 1, 1447 B 18.⁸ The point in question is indeed mentioned by Aristotle, but it is also mentioned by Plato and by other later authors who do not show any knowledge of the *Poetics*. Indeed, by reason of the language used, it is more reasonable to suppose that if the scholiast derived his idea directly from Aristotle it came from a passage treating the same theme in his dialogue *On Poets*.⁹ In any event neither in Themistius nor the scholiast is there any trace of a second book of the *Poetics*.

Rose acknowledges that he is entirely unable to explain the loss, and falls back on the explanation offered by Alexander Neckham for

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. xxiii, xxiv.

² Ritter, *op. cit.*, p. viii.

³ Bywater, *op. cit.*, p. xx.

⁴ Shute, *op. cit.*, p. 68.

⁵ Vahlen, *op. cit.*, p. 8, n.

⁶ Bywater, *op. cit.*, p. 123.

⁷ *Op. cit.*, pp. 143, 144.

⁸ Vahlen, *op. cit.*, p. 6, n.

⁹ Rose, *Fragm.*, p. 76. (No. 70; Diog. Laert., 8, 57.)

the disappearance of another work:¹ "Aristotelis viam universae carnis ingressurus subtilissima scripta sua iussit secum in sepulcro recondi, ne utilitati posteritatis suae deservirent."

The whole story of the cave at Skepsis is dubious, and the same considerations that make us doubt it also render unlikely the disappearance of so notable a work as a second book of the *Poetics*, containing a theory of comedy. It is, however, not so much the story itself as the value attached to it that is unwarranted. While the ordinary causes for the loss of classical works are sufficient, when definite traces of them at some previous time can be discovered, it has been found necessary, forsooth, to find a specific disaster for a unique manuscript to explain the loss of a work of which there is no definite witness elsewhere. That there are no surviving traces of a theory of comedy derived from a second book of the *Poetics* will appear in the course of this investigation, and we have reason to believe that, whatever the merits of the narrative of Skepsis, none of the scientific treatises of Aristotle were lost to the Peripatetic school.

Critics rely on Strabo and Athenaeus, with some aid from Plutarch, to compose the explanation that rests upon the tale of the cave.² Strabo veers slightly in the course of his narrative, for he begins by speaking of the libraries of Aristotle and Theophrastus, and then later talks of the sale of the works of Aristotle and Theophrastus by the heirs of Neleus to Apellicon of Teos. These books might, indeed, have been only the collections of these philosophers, but the remainder of his tale treats them as the original manuscripts of these authors. In the face of evidence elsewhere that Aristotelian works were in existence and that the Aristotelian school enjoyed a continuous career, Strabo's remarks that the Peripatetics lacked the genuine works of Aristotle is manifestly incredible.

In one place Athenaeus³ speaks of a certain Roman Laurentius who collected the works of Greek authors including "those of Aristotle and of Neleus, who preserved Aristotle's books, from whom our king Ptolemy Philadelphus, having bought them all, put them together with those which he had bought from Athens and Rhodes and brought them to fair Alexandria." The interest of this city in Aristotle is

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 134.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 30.

³ Shute, *op. cit.*, pp. 29 ff.

certain enough,¹ and the passage probably refers to the works of Aristotle. Athenaeus in another place, however, does not agree with his own statement, for he says that in the Athenian insurrection Apellicon took a leading part, a man who was originally a Peripatetic philosopher and had bought the library of Aristotle.²

The ready explanation of this state of affairs suggested by Shute³ is that "no really published works of Aristotle were lost to the school meanwhile," and after saying of Aristotle that "Cicero mentions him over and over again as an author well known to all, and repeatedly attacked by the Stoics and Epicureans," he rightly exclaims, "if this is oblivion, what is knowledge?"

Andronicus and Tyrannion, the editors to whom the works of Aristotle were entrusted by Sulla, do not appear to have thought they had the autographs of the philosopher. Nor does Cicero,⁴ a close friend of Tyrannion, mention what would have been a great discovery if the missing manuscripts of the works on which the Peripatetics depended were suddenly recovered and placed in the hands of immediate friends for editing.⁵ Indeed, Rome was the centre of Aristotelianism from the time of Cicero forward,⁶ and the character of that philosophy seems always to have been more congenial to the Latin than to the Greek mind. Not only were the editors Andronicus and Tyrannion residents of Rome or Romans, but Galen and Boethius, among the most important names in the study of Peripateticism, also dwelt in that city. Thus, with the great probability that, if there is any truth at all in the story of Skepsis, copies of all Aristotle's works were still in the hands of his students, the loss of a second book of the *Poetics* cannot be attributed to the damp and neglect of a cellar.

4

The evidence for a second book afforded by the cross-references in the works of Aristotle, not only for the number of books, but for the contents of the second, if such there was, is greatly impaired by a critical examination of such references in general. As a first step in this direction it may be observed that, if it is admitted that all the

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 30.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 31.

³ *Op. cit.*, pp. 33 ff.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, pp. 35 ff.; Cicero, *Fin.*, 4, 28, 79.

⁵ Shute, *op. cit.*, p. 50.

⁶ *Op. cit.*, p. 52.

numerous cross-references are genuine, it must be supposed that the philosopher had a prearranged scheme of his whole system and its execution from the very beginning, that he carried this plan in his head both for completed works and for those not written, and that the titles preconceived by Aristotle were neither changed then, nor have varied since.¹ If, however, some of them may be genuine and some not, then their genuineness or spuriousness will have to be decided on grounds quite distinct from their mere presence in the text, and it is hard to see how they can well be used as immediate proof of the facts to which they refer.² This argument holds apart from my observation in a later connection, that neither the titles of the works nor the indications of the numbers of books have any constant relation to one another in our special question. Thus a reference to matters as being in the *Poetics* is far from proving, if we fail to find them there, that they were originally in the second book.

It may be urged against the cross-references in general that they are over-elaborate; that whereas there are comparatively few to works we do not possess, these are of a vague or doubtful character; that some of them between different works could not have been inserted at the time of whichever was the earlier; that in them the same work is referred to by different names; that in some cases references in the same work to other portions of that work contradict one another because they cite it as both preceding and following a given portion; that in some cases the references which act as connecting links between two adjoining books occur at the end of one of them and at the beginning of the other; that the references imply an arrangement of works in an artificial order which could not have existed until long after the time of Aristotle; and that they contain serious errors as to the real meaning of the doctrine which they cite or its relation to the matter under discussion.

The attempt to defend the references on the score that they were inserted in a second edition by Aristotle, or that they were repeated and enlarged with such additions, is more or less futile,³ for the supposition that Aristotle ever prepared a formal edition of his scientific works is unfounded, and it is difficult to imagine a lecturer remembering so huge a course and at the same time making minute cross-

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 96.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 10.

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 26.

references to questions far removed from his discussion both in thought and order.¹

For a full exposition of these charges against the cross-references I can do no better than refer to Shute, whose fifth chapter² entitled "Of Titles and References" treats the matter thoroughly, substantiating by numerous instances all the difficulties raised above. He concludes:

"To sum up then, we find the titles of the Aristotelian books did not arrive at a fixed condition till some hundred years after the death of the master; that on the other hand the references assume all the titles as already fixed during his lifetime; and that even so they are not explicable, unless we grant further that he deliberately called several books each by two or three names; that he had planned out all his books before he began any, and carried all the details of books both written and unwritten in his head. Even these liberal assumptions will not get rid of all the difficulties, and the only satisfactory way of explaining the matter as a whole is to believe that all or the great majority of the references are post-Aristotelian, and that they proceed from editors neither of the same date nor altogether in agreement as to the nomenclature and order of precedence of the books."

5

From what has just preceded we have seen that the personal authority of Aristotle is not to be invoked for any of the references, and the motive of the editors who inserted most of them was at best to assure an acceptance of what they believed, rather than to state a universally acknowledged fact. The mode of composition and publication of Aristotle's works was, however, most favorable for the interpolation of such references. Indeed for their proper understanding his works required some such aid, so that in spite of natural reverence for the philosopher's text, scholars early inserted what they saw was necessary for the intelligent reading of the works, and the practice once begun was continued without system and with diminishing success.

The statement of the method of composition by Case is one of the most adequate.³ After mentioning several hypotheses which he finds

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 98.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 96-116.

³ *Encyclopædia Britannica*, 11th ed., Cambridge, 1911, ii, pp. 506 ff.

himself obliged to reject, he continues: "Turning to Aristotle's own works, we immediately light upon a surprise: Aristotle began his extant scientific works during Plato's lifetime. . . . However early Aristotle began a book, so long as he kept the manuscript, he could always change it. Finally he died without completing some of his works, such as the *Politics*, and notably that work of his whole philosophical career and foundation of his whole philosophy, — the *Metaphysics* — which, projected in his early criticism of Plato's philosophy of universal forms, gradually developed into his positive philosophy of individual substances, but remained unfinished after all. If then Aristotle was some thirty-five years gradually and simultaneously composing manuscript discourses into treatises and treatises into systems, he was pursuing a process which solves beforehand the very difficulties which have since been found in his writings."

On the question of the publication of Aristotle's works, Case shows that printing has given us a wrong conception of publication, and that Greek authors thought of works rather than of books issued in succession on definite dates. Philosophers especially had for their public the immediate circle of their students, so that "it does not follow that his own works went beyond his own library and his school. . . . There is . . . no contemporary proof that Aristotle published any part of his mature philosophical system in his lifetime."

Any chronological ordering of the works is therefore uncertain, and the hints for such an arrangement given by the cross-references are useless. The double versions are results of the school, the heads of which were probably less daring in their emendations of the actual text than the immediate successors of Aristotle, but found it better for the prestige of the school that the scientific works should not be published.¹ Thus the distinction between the esoteric and exoteric works grew up, the latter, which were probably the dialogues in a literary form prepared for publication by Aristotle, being cast into disrepute compared with the esoteric works in the possession of the school. That most of these scientific works did reach a limited publication later through the eager purchases of Ptolemy and the seizures of Sulla did not prevent the growth of this tradition, especially in view of the superior elaboration and originality of these treatises.²

¹ Shute, *op. cit.*, pp. 8 ff.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 37.

While the professors of the Peripatetic school could not compare in vigorous originality with their master, natural stagnation and systematization made them rely more and more on lectures from the Aristotelian text aided by increasing familiarity with the whole of his works. In this way there would be evolved a set of references to facilitate their interpretation.

Again, although Aristotle abandoned the use of the dialogue as a means of composition, it is probable, even certain, that question and answer constituted a large part of the means of instruction, and probably the occasion of a more minute development of many points about which questions were raised in the course of time.¹ This explains the frequent anticipatory use of technical terms. If, then, he did not insert the questions to which a good many passages are plainly answers, it becomes still less probable that he would have inserted cross-references.

As Shute remarks:² "There would be moreover . . . a natural tendency among editors, who were themselves usually Peripatetics, to exalt the esoteric and unpublished works above the exoteric and published ones. We find, as we should expect, that references to esoteric works are much more common in treatises which were in vogue all through the period of darkness than in those which may be supposed to have remained unpublished during that time. . . . Thus they (the Peripatetics) talk of the dialogues under the general and somewhat contemptuous name of the external doctrine, without taking the trouble to specify what special dialogue the doctrine is to be found in."

But one of the chief reasons why any plural reference, apart from that of the indices, is unreliable is that nearly all the titles of works in the Aristotelian canon, both as drawn up in the indices and in other sources, are contained in more than one book. With such a practice in vogue it is not difficult to see how any vague or general reference to the *Poetics* could easily employ the plural article, especially when to this invitation to err there was added the existence of a dialogue dealing with related matters, plurality in the number of books in the

¹ It is interesting to note that the dialogue form was employed by Minturno in his Italian exposition of the *Poetics*. In the four books of his work he represents himself as conversing in succession with Vespasiano Gonzaga, Angelo Constanzo, Bernardino Rota, and Ferrante Carafa.

² Shute, *op. cit.*, p. 103.

dialogue, and a confusion of names between the treatise and the dialogue. We are reduced thus for any information about the second book and its contents to a search for any possible traces of it elsewhere. The investigation, however, can best be made in connection with a detailed examination of each of the references to the supposed second book or its contents.

6

Although the cross-references have in general been discredited, it is well, if we can, to account for them, and to examine each separately, as far as it concerns the object of our investigation. Among the possible sources, the distortion of genuine references is an unreliable hypothesis for any definite results. Nor are we on solid ground in a hypothetical work *περὶ λέξεως*,¹ portions of which appear to have been absorbed into the *Rhetoric*, and from which some of the passages in the *Poetics*, such as that on the language of poetry, may have been taken, with a general confusion of references after this absorption, and after this work had itself disappeared. Again, some of the genuine references may have originally alluded to the dialogue, and other references to them may have been inserted afterwards; these last are more practical possibilities.

The citation from Boethius *De Interpretatione* 290, is called a false translation by Gercke² in its use of *libris*, and in the case of Boethius it is clear that he used the conception of tragedy which, I hope elsewhere to show, was contained in the dialogue *On Poets*. The reference of Boethius, however, corresponds to our treatise of the *Poetics*, and yet, although he was acquainted with it, his definition of tragedy, I believe, is not derived thence. "*In libris*" may be a general expression meaning "in one of the books which he wrote about poetry," and so may refer to the work *On Poets*. This possibility is interesting in view of the fact that while Theophrastus is not mentioned in the *Consolatio Philosophiae*, the definition of the dramatic species which we afterwards find ascribed to that philosopher agrees with the idea of Boethius. It might follow that the Theophrastian definition which Boethius would have found "*in libris*" of Aristotle was derived by Theophrastus from Aristotle directly.

¹ H. Diels, *Ueber das dritte Buch der Aristotelischen Rhetorik*, Berlin, 1886.

² Gercke, *Pauly-Wissowa*, ii, 1. col. 1053.

One of the problems to solve is the reference of the *Politics* to katharsis. Though Aristotle had promised to discuss this topic more carefully in the *Poetics*, the treatment accorded it in the latter work is still inadequate. Of course, on account of the manner of composition, a pledge on Aristotle's part, even if the reference is genuine, guarantees not fulfilment but only intention; in fact Finsler find only one case, and that doubtful, in which a general promise was fulfilled.

Next, a highly technical and obscure theory such as that of katharsis would be just the one to attract the attention of an anxious editor, who could easily overstate the case, when all he really had to rely on was a repetition of the word in *Poetics* 6. Either his memory was poor or his intention unscrupulous, for it would appear much more learned to say "for a fuller treatment of this subject, see the *Poetics*," than, "there is another place where this idea is involved but left obscure." An editor is susceptible to just such temptations, and to allow an acknowledged obscurity to remain unilluminated by his learning may be felt a reflection on his editorial capacity.

That such a theory of katharsis was to be found in the second book and survived until the fifth century is the hypothesis of Bernays,¹ who attributed to Proclus an immediate knowledge of Aristotle's treatment.² The passage of Proclus he interpreted in the light of the *Politics*,³ but as Bywater shows:⁴ "It will be observed that Proclus refers not only to Aristotle but also to other apologists for the Drama; it is quite possible, therefore, that it was from one of the latter rather than Aristotle himself that he derived his knowledge of the Aristotelian idea of katharsis. And in the context in place of the Aristotelian term he substitutes as synonyms ἀφοσίωσις and ἀπέρασις — neither of these words being found either in this or in any other sense in the extant writings of Aristotle."

Vahlen goes so far as to affirm that the discussion of katharsis came after the discussion of comedy in the second book,⁵ but Finsler shows that the source of Proclus's idea was probably Plato, and this probability is increased by the absence of a full treatment which the refer-

¹ Bywater, *op. cit.*, pp. 94, 95. Cf. p. xxi.

² Bernays, *Zwei Abhandlungen*, p. 47.

³ Finsler, *op. cit.*, p. 1.

⁴ Bywater, *op. cit.*, p. xxi.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. xxiii.

ence in the *Politics* promises. The scholarship of Proclus, moreover, is generally uncritical.¹

Farther, the explanation of katharsis which Bernays thought he discovered repeated in Proclus is doubtful, although it set men to thinking on the problem again. In objection to Bernays, Susemihl and Hicks argue:² "If we say that the 'painful emotion' of fear and pity is removed, we are reminded that the definition in the *Rhetoric* (2, C 5, C 8) makes each of these — fear itself and pity itself — a sort of pain (λύπη τις), although the emotions are generally defined as οἷς ἔπεται λύπη και ἡδονή."³ The proper explanation is certainly qualitative rather than quantitative, and the discussion by Susemihl and Hicks reviews the main positions on the question.⁴

There is the view, which is not very trustworthy, that the *Poetics* was intended only for the use of the school in lectures, so that the explanation of katharsis was oral.⁵ It is likely, indeed, that if Aristotle explained katharsis, he did it orally, but we need not therefore rashly jump at the conclusion that the *Poetics* was only a lecture-outline.⁶

Margoliouth, indeed, thinks that the whole question is adequately expounded in the *Problems*,⁷ and even if this work is not authentic, it represents an ancient view, and one probably nearer its supposed source than that of Proclus and Iamblichus. As Finsler points out, such promises frequently refer to later passages in the same work.⁸ The *Politics* to a much greater degree than the *Poetics* demands a more complete development of its topics, and if we admit the hypothesis of lost parts of works, or unfinished works, the *Politics* would be one of them. If the latter part of the *Politics* were lost or left unfinished, a later editor might have changed the reference of an earlier

¹ Finsler, *op. cit.*, p. 3; Sandys, *op. cit.*, i, p. 373.

² F. Susemihl and R. D. Hicks, *The Politics of Aristotle, Books I-IV*, London, 1894, p. 652, n. 2.

³ *Rhet.*, 2, 1, 8, 1378 A 21; *Nic. Eth.*, 2, 5, 2, 1105 B 23.

⁴ Susemihl and Hicks, *Politics*, pp. 641 ff.; pp. 650 ff.; "Katharsis as an aesthetic term."

⁵ Gercke, Pauly-Wissowa, ii, 1, col. 1037. 35.

⁶ *Op. cit.*, ii, 1. col. 1053. 17.

⁷ D. S. Margoliouth, *The Poetics of Aristotle*, London, 1911, p. 60.

⁸ Finsler, *op. cit.*, p. 8 and n. 3.

one or of the author himself to another book where the word at least occurred.¹ Finsler, indeed, believes that the expression ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς, as it stands, refers to another part of the *Politics* in which the vexed question of the relation of aesthetic interests, especially of poetry, to social interests and the state, was discussed.² In any case, it is clear that a deliberate attack on Plato, such as some critics expect, would not have been in harmony with the general character of the *Poetics* in its close following of that philosopher, and would have better suited the *Politics*.³

The significance of the theory of katharsis was small in Aristotle's view, and the whole modern assumption of a complete theory of art in Aristotle is misleading. As Bywater points out,⁴ the idea of a theory of art in general is recent, and goes back to a date no more remote than Winckelmann and Goethe. Aristotle's ideas on aesthetics were mostly those current in his own time. The modern preconceptions, the recent extreme interest in psychology of the physiological kind at which katharsis hints, and above all the splendid opportunity for endless scholarly disputes offered by so prominent an obscurity against this background, explain the exaggerated present impression of its importance.

The majority of the references to the *Poetics* in Aristotle's works are to be found in the *Rhetoric*, and half of these are capable of verification. In addition to this, it is to be noted that none of the references in the Aristotelian works ever specify a *second* book. But of those which are capable of verification, all correspond to passages in chapters 21 and 22. Chapter 20, immediately preceding, which begins the discussion of diction with a passage on the parts of speech and other grammatical details, Butcher considers⁵ "probably interpolated," and he accordingly brackets it.⁶ Chapters 21 and 22 continue the subject with special reference to poetic diction, and in chapter 21 there is a passage on the gender of nouns that Butcher also rejects. Although, as we have seen from the theory on Aristotle's method of composition, the inconsistencies that are here evident do not disprove the genuineness

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 8 and n. 2.

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 6.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 8.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. vii.

⁵ S. H. Butcher, *Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art*, 3d ed., London, 1902, p. 3.

⁶ *Op. cit.*, pp. 71 ff.

of the chapters in which they occur, it must be admitted that such looseness of construction made very easy the introduction of somewhat irrelevant materials, and the task of an early editor like Andronicus must often have been complicated by short, incomplete passages which were not closely connected nor capable of close connection with any of the set treatises. Such a conjecture is aided by the possibility of the inclusion in these chapters of passages from an earlier rhetorical work *περὶ λέξεως*. Ritter accordingly doubts the validity of the references in the *Rhetoric* to such matters in the *Poetics*, and attacks the authenticity of chapters 21 and 22.¹ Gercke doubts the authenticity of the end of chapters 12, 20, and the end of 21. He thinks them inserted under the influence of the later Stoic grammar in the third century, and holds the position of chapter 15 doubtful.² Ritter, indeed, devotes considerable attention to developing a theory of an interpolator and abridger in the *Poetics*.³

Cicero, at any rate, in his comment on this passage in the *Rhetoric* where one of the references to the *Poetics* occurs, says nothing about a second book of the *Poetics*, nothing at all in fact about a parallel treatment of the matter elsewhere.⁴

Diels elaborated the theory of the work *περὶ λέξεως* spoken of above.⁵ He shows that Aristotle must have been the author, and that it was later combined with the two books on *Rhetoric* into the work as we have it. This theory provides some interesting possible consequences; namely, either that the same person who combined the *περὶ λέξεως* with the *Rhetoric* inserted some of the materials in the *Poetics*, and that this enlarged edition of the *Poetics* was not, however, the one which gained widest acceptance; or that early criticism rejected part of the insertions. If the insertions had been made before the work reached Andronicus, perhaps their partial elimination is due to him. These conjectures, however, only add to the reasons for holding the evidence of the references from the *Rhetoric* to the *Poetics* in slight esteem.

¹ Ritter, *op. cit.*, pp. 230-243.

² Gercke, Pauly-Wissowa, ii, 1. col. 1053. 48.

³ Ritter, *op. cit.*, pp. xx ff.

⁴ Cicero, *De Or.*, 2, 58.

⁵ Diels, *Ueber das dritte Buch*, p. 34.

The references to a treatment of the ridiculous, moreover, may have been based on the *Ethics*, as was largely the case with the discussion in the *Tractatus Coislinianus*. Indeed, this treatise, manifestly of Peripatetic origin, and showing several different strata in its development to its present state, may have been thought to be a part of the original *Poetics* by some editors, and these references may actually correspond to it.

It is, however, the pledge, found in *Poetics* 6, 1449 B 21, to deal with comedy later that, next to the authority of the indices seems to impress most critics with the necessity for a second book. But this reference comes in at the head of a new division, in which the philosopher begins the discussion of tragedy alone, so that it was probably used as a connecting link, perhaps originally inserted in the margin, but afterwards creeping into the text.

Part of the promise contained in this passage of the *Poetics* is fulfilled to the satisfaction of critics, — that regarding “the poetry which imitates in hexameter verse,” but the remarks on comedy in chapter 5 do not appear to these persons sufficient for the purpose of the initial announcement. Aristotle says merely: “I propose to treat of Poetry in itself and of its various kinds. . . . Epic poetry, and Tragedy, Comedy also and Dithyrambic poetry, and the music of the flute and of the lyre in most of their forms, are all in their general conception modes of imitation.”¹

There is a further possibility that, although the part of the reference which touches epic was correct, the insertion of the words “and of comedy” was a further addition, probably by a still later scribe after the reference to epic had fixed a place for itself in the text. This sentence comes immediately after some remarks on the relations of tragedy and epic, and following it is the series of chapters on tragedy. It is not strictly necessary, and without it the treatise as it stands would be self-sufficient and consistent.

Düntzer points out that the beginning of the fifth chapter indicates that the philosopher does not intend to discuss comedy further.² This reference is not a mere transition, but contains an essential step of progress in the thought of Aristotle, and does not bear the mark of

¹ *Poetics*, I. 1447 A 1,2.

² Düntzer, *Zeit. f. d. Alt.* (1842), pp. 278 ff. Cf. p. 283.

the scribe. Here the writer implies that he closes the subject of the nature of comedy by connecting his observations with some preceding remarks on the object of imitation in comedy. In the treatment of tragedy, which begins in the next section of this same chapter, he does not refer back to the determination of tragedy's object, as he does for comedy, for the very reason that he has not closed the subject, but develops it more fully in the famous definition at the beginning of chapter 6. It is therefore only reasonable to suppose that Aristotle would not have connected his points at the beginning of chapter 5 with his philosophy of imitation, and then have stated his conception of the ridiculous in this place if he had ever intended to treat it later. This is a consideration which does not depend on the use of mere references of transition, but indicates a greater degree of coherence than is usual in most of the Aristotelian works, a merit which it could the more easily have possessed had it been originally short and self-contained, without the addition of a second book.

A further evidence of Aristotle's intention to finish up the treatment of comedy at this point is his balancing of various aspects of the subject, and thus a brief statement of why there is no history of comedy is set against an outline of the evolution of tragedy. Since, however, to his mind enough had been said about the aesthetics of a dramatic species in which he was not much interested, he parallels the later elaboration of his definition of tragedy with the cursory remarks on comedy at the beginning of chapter 5.

Still further, at the end of chapter 22 before the consideration of epic, which is promised in the first words of chapter 6, we read, "concerning tragedy and imitation by means of action this may suffice." Now, this sentence, by whomever inserted, whether by Aristotle or by the customary editor with his method of joining together separate portions of the treatise at this point, establishes several facts. One is that the writer judged that the discussion of all drama — "imitation by means of action" — had been finished when the treatise reached this point. Next, that more about comedy did not follow this observation. Then, except for the words "and of comedy," this reference in chapter 6, whatever its origin, was correct, for the discussion of epic is delayed by it until after tragedy; when tragedy is done, there is another transition, summing up the drama as a whole, and the epic

is taken up according to the announcement. Yet just as the latter reference at the end of chapter 22 states that here ends the discussion of drama, — *περὶ μὲν οὖν τραγωδίας καὶ τῆς ἐν τῷ πράττειν μιμήσεως*, so the promise about epic, *περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς ἐν ἑξαμέτροις μιμητικῆς* is fulfilled, and at the very end of the treatise we find it said in conclusion:¹ “Thus much may suffice concerning Tragic and Epic poetry in general.”²

As epic represented for Aristotle all the *διηγηματικῆ*, so did tragedy represent all the forms of poetry which imitate *ἐν τῷ πράττειν*. There is also the obviously awkward connection of comedy with the designation of epic as the poetry which “imitates in hexameter verse” — one a conception according to medium employed, and the other according to the aesthetic principle, if “comedy” means anything in this context. It is possible, indeed, reasoning on the basis of 23, 1, that, instead of the word *κωμωδίας*, the word *διηγηματικῆς* originally stood in chapter 6,³ while another scribe, misunderstanding or disliking the word, inserted in the margin the word *κωμωδίας*, and that this was substituted for the original.⁴

As already noted, there are no traces of the supposed treatment of comedy from the second book to be found in Varro or any of the grammarians. There is, indeed, the *Tractatus Coislinianus*, which Bernays held contained some reflections of that lost book. He himself, however, pointed out the secondary and derivative character of this reflection, and from that beginning, scholarly opinion has gone so far as to say, with Bywater:⁵ “There is no evidence to show that the

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 283.

² *Poetics*, 26. 1462 B 8.

³ For in 23. 1459 A 17 *ἐν[ι] μέτρῳ* corresponds to *ἐν ἑξαμέτροις* but *διηγηματικῆς* while more suitable than *τραγωδίας*, is not its equivalent, although found in the corresponding position. There has been a good deal of doubt, indeed, as to the proper reading in 23. 1459 A 17. Butcher, on the basis of 1449 B 11 and 1459 B 32, writes *ἐνι μέτρῳ*, although the codices have *ἐν μέτρῳ*, and he notes the reading *ἐν ἑξαμέτρῳ* of Heinsius. This last Vahlen also notes, but adopts the reading of the codices. Bywater agrees with Vahlen in his text.

As Aristotle seems to include all non-dramatic poetry under the term, *διηγηματικῆ* alone is not the equivalent of that division, while, if *διηγηματικῆς* were there instead of *κωμωδίας*, it would then present a logical indication of the whole field of non-dramatic poetry and of that part of it which is actually treated in chapters 23 ff.

⁴ Düntzer, *op. cit.*, p. 282.

⁵ Bywater, *op. cit.*, pp. xxi, xxii.

later grammarians knew of Book II, or of the theory of Comedy which must have formed part of it. But there is evidence showing it to have been unknown to them. The so-called *Tractatus Coislinianus* preserves a definition of comedy, which has no doubt a certain Aristotelian look; any one can see, however, by simple inspection that it is nothing more than an adaptation, or rather, as Bernays calls it, a travesty, of the well-known definition of Tragedy in the existing *Poetics*."

The enumeration of the parts of comedy is the same as that in Tzetzes, who appears to have got it from Euclides. But then, if, as some scholars think, Euclides was a grammarian of the classical period,¹ it only proves that neither the compiler of the *Tractatus*, nor the early grammarian had seen any second book. Nobody expects Tzetzes to furnish any reliable evidence on such points.

Nevertheless, while Aristotelian scholars have tested the *Tractatus* and found it wanting, the specialists in Aristophanes have in recent times become aware of it, and accorded it a more hospitable reception than it ever before received. Starkie relies implicitly on the findings of Bernays, and asserts:² "The value of this fragment was not fully realized till Bernays demonstrated that it represented a summary, mutilated and misunderstood in parts, of Aristotle's analysis of the laughter in comedy. . . . Rutherford alone has shown a due appreciation of its value." Later he reproduces with approval³ the definition of comedy found in the *Tractatus*, and indulges in a laborious classification of "the various methods of exciting laughter employed by the writers of old comedy, especially Aristophanes," "according to the division of Aristotle," i. e., the *Tractatus*.⁴

What Starkie terms a "due appreciation" of the value of the *Tractatus* by Rutherford is rather immoderate zeal. He says:⁵ "It is not that the laughter of comedy had not been properly analyzed. Even the scrimp and grudging abstract, now sole relic of the section in the *Poetics* concerned with Comedy, will convince anybody who keeps it in his head as he listens to Greek comic πρόσωπα, that a Greek had

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. xxii.

² W. J. M. Starkie, *The Acharnians of Aristophanes*, London, 1909, p. xxxviii.

³ *Op. cit.*, p. xl.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. xxxviii.

⁵ W. G. Rutherford, *A Chapter in the History of Annotation, being Scholia Aristophanica Vol. III*, London, 1905, p. 435, l. 19.

indeed read for Greeks the most secret heart of the 'mother of comedy,' and probe in hand, had made clear wherefore it beat and what it was made of. . . . But Aristotle thought too much and was too great an observer to be loved by commentator and rhetor. Living at ease within their pale of words, it was not likely they would venture outside to be exposed to the perils and pains of thinking."

Rutherford dilates on the *Tractatus* and its application to the methods and interpretation of Aristophanes.¹

Except for Kayser's recent treatment, it is Bernays who has offered the chief detailed discussion of the *Tractatus*; a discussion which is the fountain-head of the whole modern belief in the second book as a fact established to the satisfaction of scholars. He "demonstrated," as Starkie puts it, "that it represented a summary" only by employing in an extremely bold and often unwarranted fashion most of the evidence we have seen reason to reject.

Bernays first premises that, in order to establish the fact that Aristotle did treat comedy fully in the *Poetics*, the announcement at the beginning of the *Poetics* to treat all poetry should be taken in conjunction with the reference at the beginning of chapter 6 to speak about comedy later, together with the unsatisfied references in the *Rhetoric*.² Since these premises do not necessarily lead to such a conclusion, his case is thereby almost lost.

Bernays next gives the text of the *Tractatus*³ and makes the following observations upon it. First, there is no unity apparent in the treatment except that of subject.⁴ Next, the beginning of the *Tractatus* is unpromising because its division of poetry into imitative and non-imitative flies in the face of the plain declaration of the *Poetics* where Empedocles is even refused the title of poet because his verse does not imitate. In addition to this he discovers several other notable errors, from the Aristotelian point of view, in the *Tractatus*. First there is the employment of *δι' οἴκτου καὶ δέους* for Aristotle's *ἔλεος καὶ φόβος*. Second, there is a balancing between fear and sympathy, whereas the *Rhetoric* expounds a theory according to which sympathy ought not to be *ἐκκρουστικὸν τοῦ ἔλεου*. Third, it is stated that tragedy *ἔχει μητέρα τὴν λύπην*. This assertion is based on the *Rhet-*

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 435-455.

² Bernays, *Zwei Abhandlungen*, p. 135.

³ *Op. cit.*, pp. 137-139.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 140.

oric, but in the *Poetics* Aristotle plainly speaks of a proper ἡδονή in tragedy.¹

When he comes to the definition of comedy contained in the *Tractatus*,² Bernays exclaims: ³ "Diese seinsollende Definition der Komödie ist nichts als eine jämmerlich ungeschickte Travestie der aristotelischen von der Tragödie." The sentimentality of the statement that comedy has τὸν γέλωτα as μητέρα is glaringly repugnant to all that we know of Aristotle.⁴

There are, indeed, as Bernays points out, certain opinions on comedy expressed by Aristotle, especially in the *Poetics*, the *Ethics*, and the *Politics*, where the laughter of comedy is touched on.⁵ But, as he also shows, later grammarians mistook Aristotle's views, confined to Middle Comedy, for the whole of the subject.⁶ Thus the distinction between λαιδορία and κωμωδία might have been derived in the first place from the *Poetics*, as the wording is not un-Aristotelian, except the expression ἔμφασις, for which Aristotle's equivalent is ὑπόνοια.

Section 5 of the *Tractatus*, Bernays proves, derives from the *Ethics*,⁷ and the balance in section 6 between γέλως and τέρψις is modelled after the φόβος and ἔλεος of tragedy in the *Poetics*.⁸

To strengthen his case, Bernays at this point digresses on the probable influence of the Peripatetics on New Comedy, and of the relation of Theophrastus to Menander, saying that the *Poetics* agree in the main with the practice of this poet.⁹

Returning to the *Tractatus*, Bernays notes that the six elements ascribed to comedy are modelled on those attributed to tragedy by Aristotle.¹⁰ The elaboration of this number of elements for comedy, once they were obtained, shows a surprisingly ingenious though superficial manipulation of other Aristotelian texts.¹¹ The pedantry of the achievement puzzled Cramer and other editors of the work, and the results move Bernays to term it "eine Verkehrtheit" . . . "je

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 141 ff.

² Kaibel, *Comicarum Graecorum Fragmenta*, i, 1, Berlin, 1899, p. 50, 3.

³ Bernays, *Zwei Abhandlungen*, p. 145.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 147.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 148.

⁶ *Op. cit.*, p. 150.

⁷ *Op. cit.*, p. 151.

⁸ *Op. cit.*, p. 151.

⁹ *Op. cit.*, p. 152.

¹⁰ *Op. cit.*, p. 153.

¹¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 154.

deutlicher der mechanische Weg zu Tage liegt." ¹ The expansion of μέλος is believed by him, however, to point to a more complete work.²

At this point, however, Bernays feels justified in asserting that "Was über sie (die Komödie) daher der Excerptor in der jetzigen Poetik nicht Nachweisbares beibringt, darf füglich aus dem vollständigeren Exemplar hergeleitet werden, wofern innere Gründe nicht dawider sind." ³ But since, as our case now stands, genuine and independent traces of a theory of comedy must appear in the *Tractatus*, the contrary conclusion to what Bernays states naturally flows from his previous examination.

The division and discussion of the comic characters is, indeed, genuinely Aristotelian, but not independent, for it could all be found elsewhere than in the *Poetics*, and easily accessible to the ingenuity of the scholar who composed the *Tractatus*.⁴ Thus Bernays is compelled to admit that: ⁵ "Vielleicht hätte ein glücklich spüreder Scharfsinn, ohne weitere Hilfe, aber dann auch wohl ohne allgemeinere Zustimmung, bloß aus diesen Stellen der Ethik und Rhetorik die nach Aristoteles an sich komischen Charaktere auf die drei zurückführen können, welche der Excerptor nennt. Diesem wird nach dem Ungeschick das er schon zweimal bei Benutzung der Rhetorik gezeigt, Niemand gerade hier eine so glänzende Combinationskraft beimessen wollen; und wenn in Ethik und Rhetorik jene Dreizahl angedeutet scheint, so ist das nur ein Beweis mehr, dass Aristoteles sie auch in der Poetik aufgestellt und der Excerptor sie von dort abgeschrieben hat." Bernays then outlines Aristotle's probable treatment of the whole question of comedy, but acknowledges that "der Excerptor hat nur die Rubrik desselben ausgezogen."

Now when a critic makes capital of his deficits in this fashion he can prove almost anything. Differences in degree of pedantic acumen and in accuracy are easily accounted for by the assumption that the *Tractatus* represents not the work of one scholar, but an accumulation of the work of a number of rhetorical investigators. Of course the excerptor made gross errors in combining his scattered hints, but it is not necessary to suppose that he was the same who formulated the defini-

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 156.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 157.

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 158.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 159.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, pp. 163 ff.

tion, and furthermore, it is not improbable that the same scrupulous pedant who succeeded so well in unearthing every available suggestion from Aristotle, would fail lamentably when he employed a merely patient and mechanical method to arrive at a critical development which it would have required Aristotle's own genius to make equal in value to the definition of tragedy and its relation to the principle of imitation. It is a weak argument to say that the defects of the author of the *Tractatus* prove him incapable of an investigation which demanded only care and patience, and that therefore the valid portions must derive from a book in which they were assembled by Aristotle himself. To contend that the excerptor gives only the headlines of the chapters of this second book is an interpretation which cannot in the nature of the case be disproved, but there has been no reason alleged why we should believe it.

Bernays's further remarks on what is said in the *Tractatus* about the diction of comedy only show, as he himself states, that this material too is derived from other existing works of Aristotle.¹ And finally, he produces the evidence of Simplicius on synonyms and of the Anti-atticist, with which I shall deal shortly below.²

Reich is one of the recent scholars who have discussed the *Tractatus*, and he relies on Bernays to support his own peculiar theory.³

Kayser, whose results in the matter are the most credible of all, fully reviews the previous investigations of the treatise, and attempts to evaluate them.⁴ He also cites the particular judgments on the definition of comedy, among them that of Baumgart, who desired to ascribe it as it stands directly to Aristotle.⁵

As to the authorship and date, Koett suggests Remmius Palaemon, a contemporary of Varro.⁶ Kayser concludes with the opinion that the source, of which the *Tractatus* is a summary, dates from the first century B.C., in the time of Andronicus of Rhodes.⁷ The same scholar also puts forward the interesting hypothesis that the *Tractatus* and Diomedes derive from the same source.

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 165.

² *Op. cit.*, pp. 169, 170.

³ H. Reich, *Der Mimus*, Berlin, 1903, i, p. 249.

⁴ J. Kayser, *De Veterum Arte Poetica Quaestiones Selectae*, Diss., Leipzig, 1906, p. 5.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 31.

⁶ E. Koett, *De Diomedis Artis Poeticae Fontibus*, Diss., Jena, 1904, p. 49.

⁷ Kayser, *op. cit.*, p. 43.

After thus disposing of the main points on which critics have depended for a theory of the second book, there remain only a few of the less important references. Among these is the reference of Simplicius to Aristotle for a treatment of synonyms. Rose, however, shows that this is derived from Porphyry, and in turn depends upon the reference in the *Rhetoric*.¹

The allusion of the Antiatticist is very slight evidence in any case, and it is not at all certain that this anonymous controversialist referred to the *Poetics* in citing Aristotle. Even allowing this unknown writer the merit of honesty, we are not obliged to conclude that his memory was sound or his source genuine. The matter to which he alludes may possibly have been contained in the work *περι λέξεως*, afterwards absorbed into the *Rhetoric*, or even in chapters of it inserted in the *Poetics* that later editors rejected.

Bywater notes various anomalies of thought or language in the *Poetics*.² Among these he mentions: the anticipatory use of technical terms afterwards defined; variations of terminology; inconsistencies in the use of terms; inconsistency of thought; and lapses of memory. Yet he also defends the philosopher on the ground of his natural limitations, showing how the Greek play limited Aristotle's views by its conventions with regard to stage presentation, form and structure, motives and subjects.³ His ideal play was a compromise between the drama of the great period and that of his own generation, seventy years after the death of Euripides. Among the evidences of this assertion that Bywater brings forward are: Aristotle's theory of tragic diction, and the silence about the chorus; his concessions in plot to the more sensitive feelings of his audience instead of the harsh situations of the older tragedy; and the fact that his theory of comedy would have been more applicable to the New Comedy than to Aristophanes. For the state of the text he has the usual arguments.

Bywater also records his opinion, however, that "the book as it is with occasional sidelights from other works is intelligible enough."⁴ Now it is much more intelligible if we do not look for something in the *Poetics* which there is no reason to suppose ever was there, or to feel disappointed when we fail to find it.

¹ Rose, *Arist. Libr. Ord.*, p. 133.

³ Bywater, *op. cit.*, pp. xiv ff.

² *Op. cit.*, pp. viii, ix.

⁴ Bywater, *op. cit.*, p. viii.

In the course of this investigation I have tried to deal impartially with all the evidence urged for the existence of a second book, and with the scholars who held such an opinion based on that evidence. The only direct statements that there were two books, those of the indices, have been considered; and those references have been given which indicate that there was more than one book, — from the Aristotelian text itself, from Ammonius, Boethius, Eustratius, and an anonymous commentator on the *Rhetoric*. In addition there were the matters supposed to have been in the *Poetics*, but not now found there, indicated by the time-references to the *Poetics*: the promise about comedy; the cross-references of the *Rhetoric* to the *Poetics* about the ridiculous; the incomplete discussion of katharsis; and the theory on comedy, reflections of which Bernays thought he found in the *Tractatus Coislinianus*. Further matters which might have been found there, according to scholars, were: a discussion of synonyms; a treatment of the drama in defence against Plato; and something on comic diction. This outline was followed by a brief statement of how the tradition of a lost second book began and was developed.

Against this case it was argued that all the three indices are unreliable; that there are also references elsewhere in which the *Poetics* is spoken of as contained in one book; that the inconsistent tales, especially that of the cave at Skepsis, and other expedients demonstrate the difficulty in accounting for the loss of the second book, which is easily avoided by a rejection of the supposition that there ever was one. Then came a detailed examination of the cross-references in general, where it was shown that they cannot be used as direct proof of any of their implications; and Aristotle's manner of composition and publication was discussed. The investigation was concluded with an analysis of the various references individually, with negative results as to their validity, including a refutation of the claim of Bernays to have found traces of the complete theory of comedy. The final result is a conclusion that there was no second book. While it is logically impossible to prove a universal negative, there is no reason for us to believe, in this case, that there ever was a second book; and the facts of the case are all harmonized and accommodated to one another without such an hypothesis.

III. THE DIALOGUES OF ARISTOTLE¹

The dialogues were, as Shute observes, "the compositions of Aristotle with which antiquity was best acquainted, and for which, next to the *Πολιτεῖαι*, we have the best authority."² Since there is abundant evidence from many sources that Aristotle used dialogues in the first period of his work,³ Rose attributes this disproportionate influence of the *Politics* and the dialogues to the fact that, while the *Politics*, by reason of the range of subjects treated, were especially interesting to grammarians and historians, the dialogues, because they treated the questions common to philosophy after Plato in an easy, lucid and popular style, attracted not only the philosophers of the Roman Empire, but also the later rhetoricians. Among these Rose mentions Panaetius, Posidonius, Andronicus, Didymus, Varro, Cicero, Dio Chrysostom, Julian, Themistius, Basil, and Plutarch.⁴ Indeed, the researches of Bernays, proving that by the exoteric works reference is had to the dialogues, show that, in view of the unbroken testimony of antiquity, the dialogues were Aristotle's in a sense that can be applied to none of the other accepted works in the Aristotelian canon.⁵

The references we have are mostly historical notes, and arouse no suspicion against their genuineness. It is true that Fragment 76 contains a statement about Homer, apparently based on a tradition prevalent in Ios. The questionableness of this statement cannot prove the dialogue spurious, for it is clear that an author does not necessarily believe all the statements put into the mouth of the speakers in a dialogue.⁶

The example followed by the master in dealing with poetry in dialogues seems not to have been an isolated performance, and we find

¹ J. Bernays, *Die Dialoge des Aristoteles im Verhältniss zu seinen übrigen Werken*, Berlin, 1863; E. Heitz, *Die verlorenen Schriften des Aristoteles*, Leipzig, 1865; Schlottmann, *Ars dialogorum quas vicissitudines apud Graecos et Romanos subierit*, Rostock, 1889, pp. 19-25; R. Hirzel, *Der Dialog*, 2 vols., Leipzig, 1895.

² Shute, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

³ Zeller, *op. cit.*, i, p. 55, n. 2.

⁴ Rose, *Arist. Pseud.*, p. 23.

⁵ Shute, *op. cit.*, p. 105.

⁶ Zeller, *op. cit.*, i, p. 58, n. 1.

Heraclides, among the Peripatetics, writing a dialogue *περὶ ποιητικῆς καὶ τῶν ποιητῶν α'*.¹ Indeed, Heraclides appears to have written a number of works on the subject.² He also probably showed the influence of Plato here; and he is coupled together with Aristotle by Dio Chrysostom, as being a writer in that form in which Plato was the first.³

One of the characteristics of Aristotle's extant dialogues in which they differed widely from his other works was their style. That Aristotle himself estimated very exactly the literary quality of Plato's dialogues we see from what appears to be a fragment of his dialogue *On Poets*,⁴ where he says that they are midway between verse and prose. A distinct and deliberately planned literary excellence was one of the qualities that antiquity specially noted also in Aristotle's dialogues. We may refer, for instance, to the passage in Ammonius where the beauty and appropriateness of the language is mentioned,⁵ and to another passage in Elias.⁶

The style, indeed, was, as Themistius observes, the principal attraction of the dialogues for the readers of Aristotle. Cicero, except for the *Rhetoric*, does not, on the evidence found in his works, seem to have read much else of Aristotle but the dialogues.⁷ His remarks concerning their style suggest the same conclusion.⁸ Cicero's allusions to Theophrastus establish similar facts for the style of Aristotle's most famed disciple, and, as Zeller says, "In his case, as in Aristotle's, this merit belongs chiefly to his popular writings, and especially to the dialogues, which, like Aristotle's, are described as exoteric."⁹ It was even said, though on insufficient grounds, by some of the ancients, that Theophrastus received his name on account of his graceful style.¹⁰

¹ Rose, *Arist. Pseud.*, p. 77; Diogenes Laertius, *De viis, dogmatibus clarorum philosophorum libri x*, 2 vols., Amsterdam, 1692, 5, 86; 5, 88.

² O. Voss, *De Heraclidis Pontici Vita et Scriptis*. Diss., Rostock, 1896, p. 31.

³ Rose, *Fragm.*, p. 24; Dio Chrys., *Or.*, p. 634, Emp.

⁴ Rose, *Fragm.*, p. 28; Diog. Laert., 3, 37.

⁵ Rose, *Fragm.*, p. 23; Ammonius, *Proleg. in Arist. categ.* (p. 36 B 28 Br.).

⁶ Rose, *Fragm.*, p. 23; Elias in *Arist. cat.*, p. 26 B 35.

⁷ Shute, *op. cit.*, p. 64.

⁸ Rose, *Fragm.*, p. 23; Themist., *Or.*, 26 p. 385, l. 28, Dind; Hirzel, *op. cit.*, i, p. 280; Cicero *Acad. pr.* 119.

⁹ Zeller, *op. cit.*, ii, p. 352, and n. 1.

¹⁰ *Op. cit.*, ii, p. 348, n. 3.

Another known feature of the Aristotelian dialogues was their method. Cicero testifies that the speeches of other persons were so introduced that Aristotle himself was always the principal speaker.¹ This characteristic is otherwise described by Basil² as a practice of direct statement in distinction from the contrast of opinions employed by Plato.³ From Cicero we also learn that in dialogues of more than one book, each part had its own preface.⁴ On this question Proclus gives similar information.⁵ From such evidence has also been derived the accepted belief that the dialogues were essentially distinct in form and method from the extant treatises.⁶

In support of Bernays's opinion that exoteric and published works are identical and refer almost all to the dialogues, may be adduced the practice of referring to the other works in ways which indicate that only the dialogues were considered finished literary productions and so worthy of publication.⁷ Thus the reference in the *Poetics* to one of the published works is most naturally assigned to the dialogue *On Poets*, as Zeller remarks,⁸ rather than to the *Rhetoric*, as Rose suggests,⁹ since there is no corresponding passage there. Vahlen agrees with Zeller on this point,¹⁰ and while exoteric may include some of the more popular of the really esoteric class, such as the *Rhetoric* and the *Politics*, we can reasonably infer, because of the absence in these of passages corresponding to references which require an exoteric or published work, that the dialogue *On Poets* is meant.¹¹ Thus, while the works still entire in the accepted Aristotelian canon afford little definite proof of the genuineness of the dialogues, the unanimous agreement of antiquity shows that the editors who inserted such references to exoteric or published works had authentic Aristotelian dialogues which they could have cited, and from the character of the fragments pre-

¹ Rose, *Fragm.*, p. 23; Cicero, *Ep. ad Att.*, 13, 19.

² Rose, *Fragm.*, p. 23; Basil, *Epist.*, 135.

³ Hirzel, *op. cit.*, i, p. 275.

⁴ Shute, *History*, p. 64. Cf. Cicero, *Ad Att.*, 4, 16, 2; 13, 19, 4.

⁵ Rose, *Fragm.*, p. 23; Proclus, *In Parmen.*, t. iv, p. 54 Cous.

⁶ Zeller, *op. cit.*, i, p. 55.

⁷ Shute, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

⁸ Zeller, *op. cit.*, i, p. 58, n. 1.

⁹ Rose, *De Arist. Libr. Ord.*, p. 79.

¹⁰ Vahlen, *op. cit.*, p. 36, n. on *Poetics*, 15. 1454 B 18.

¹¹ Shute, *op. cit.*, p. 21.

served, we believe these fragments to be Aristotelian and to show that the dialogues contained passages corresponding to such references. Furthermore, it is an equally reasonable hypothesis that references to the *Poetics* which are not otherwise definitely accounted for, may, on account of the confusion of *On Poets* and *Poetics* as titles of both the dialogue and the treatise, correspond to passages in the dialogue.

Since antiquity great confusion has been caused by the similarity in names between the *Poetics* and *On Poets*, one of them a formal treatise and the other a dialogue. Allusions to these works are inextricably contradictory, for with two works, each called by either of two titles, and with references to both of the titles and both works as in from one to three books, there are twelve possible combinations.

Beside the easy confusion occasioned by the close similarity of names, the *Poetics* and *On Poets*, and a resemblance in subject-matter, we must also reckon with the possibility that the dialogue, as the only formally published work, received a title earlier, and that general agreement on the title of the treatise was not reached in antiquity.

That the work *On Poets* was a dialogue cannot, as we have shown, be fully proved, but if the treatise is by agreement entitled the *Poetics*, then we must call the dialogue *On Poets*. The real question is then: how did the dialogue differ in method and treatment from the treatise, and what other facts are known about it?

The orthodox view, with its inherent difficulties more or less glossed over, is set forth by Rose,¹ and may be summarized in the following manner. That the three books *On Poets*, which are mentioned near the beginning of the index of Diogenes Laertius, were really written in the manner of a dialogue² is expressly stated in the *Vita Marciana* of Aristotle.³ In spite of the confusion of titles, the dialogue is distinguished by having one book more than the treatise.⁴ In the dialogue were also discussed the art of poetry,⁵ its nature as a kind of imitation, its function in the state, and so forth, — all this incapable of demonstration by Rose's method of treating the evidence. If, however, one

¹ Rose, *Arist. Pseud.*, pp. 77-86.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 25.

³ Rose, *Fragm.*, p. 76; *Vita Aristotelis Marciana* (cod. 257) f. 276 A; Rose, *Arist. Pseud.*, p. 77.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, pp. 77, 78; Zeller, *op. cit.*, i, p. 58, n. 1.

⁵ Rose, *Arist. Pseud.*, p. 78.

of the works was in at least one book and the other in three, and if there is no reason to suppose that the treatise, called the *Poetics*, was in more than one book, then the dialogue *On Poets* was in three.

The character of the dialogue is ascertainable with tolerable certainty. Hirzel shows that the dialogue discussed the relation of philosophy to poetry, and contends that, while critics usually consider it a purely historical work, excluding the theoretical discussion of poetry, they do not make it clear how the history of poetry could suitably be made the matter of a dialogue, even of an Aristotelian one.¹ The fragments themselves lead to an opposite conclusion. The examples were probably cited to sustain points of the argument as in the Socratic dialogues, and the fragment which maintains that when the philosopher rhymes or the poet philosophizes, either the poetry or the philosophy is inferior, indicates a philosophical discussion of a quite Platonic character.² Indeed, it is a purely philosophical distinction which opposes historical to poetic truth as the difference between particular and general truth, so that at the end of the Aristotelian dialogue Socrates, who first investigated general conceptions with worthy results, and Homer,³ who above all others deserved the name of poet, could be brought together. This conjunction, as we learn from the fragments, probably occurred in the third and last book,⁴ and the critical theory involved agrees with that in the *Poetics* and the *Metaphysics*.⁵

It has been supposed that the dialogue also treated the art of poetry, a supposition which would explain how the dialogue could sometimes be entitled the *Poetics*.⁶ Bywater thinks that, at any rate, the dialogue did not devote special attention to the question of stage-effects.⁷

The relation of the dialogue *On Poets* to the treatise the *Poetics* has been several times discussed,⁸ and it has been thought possible that many of the references to matters poetic which are not found in the

¹ Hirzel, *op. cit.*, i, p. 288 and n.

² *Op. cit.*, i, p. 288.

³ Bywater, *op. cit.*, p. 109. Note on *Poetics* 1, 1447 B 18.

⁴ Gercke, Pauly-Wissowa, ii, 1, col. 1052. 63.

⁵ Hirzel, *op. cit.*, i, p. 289.

⁶ Zeller, *op. cit.*, i, p. 58, n. 1.

⁷ Bywater, *op. cit.*, p. 233.

⁸ Düntzer, *op. cit.*, p. 278.

Poetics might have been in the work *On Poets*. This hypothesis is surely as valid and reasonable on its face as the theory that such matters were to be found in a second book of the *Poetics*. Two of the parallels in Athenaeus to the *Poetics* noted by Vahlen¹ might conceivably have been drawn rather from the dialogue, as well as another parallel, also noted by Vahlen, in the *Anonymus de comoedia*.² Moreover, the passage in Themistius, possibly, but by no means certainly, an expansion of information derived from the *Poetics*, might, in view of his acquaintance with the dialogue, have more probably been derived from the latter. Von Christ judges, finally, that the dialogue was a preliminary discussion, followed later by a more profound and technical work.³

The matter of the dialogue is broadly indicated in the extant fragments. Much of the surviving material is not assigned to any particular book, but there are a number of cases in which the book is indicated. Thus, in the first book there was a discussion of the dialogue form and a reference to Plato,⁴ a fact which is further established by the evidence of Athenaeus.⁵

The second book, according to Macrobius, introduced the evidence of Euripides on a question of Aetolian customs.⁶

The third book, according to Diogenes Laertius, gave an anecdote about Socrates.⁷ In this book, also, there was the discredited story about Homer's origin,⁸ and from these indications the matter of the other fragments can to some extent be grouped in the different books, so that we may now agree with Hirzel that the place of the passage mentioning both Socrates and Homer was at the conclusion of the whole work.⁹

¹ Athenaeus, 8, 367 B; ii, p. 302, ed. Kaibel; cf. Vahlen, *op. cit.*, p. 53, n: and Athenaeus, 9, 433 C; ii, p. 442, ed. Kaibel; cf. Vahlen, *op. cit.*, p. 51, n.

² Vahlen, *op. cit.*, p. 13, n. on *Poetics*, 4. 1449 B 7.

³ Von Christ, *Geschichte*, i, p. 674.

⁴ Rose, *Fragm.*, p. 77; Diog. Laert., 3, 48.

⁵ Rose, *Fragm.*, p. 78; Athen., xi, p. 505 C.

⁶ Rose, *Fragm.*, p. 78; Macrobi., *Saturn.*, 5, 18, 19.

⁷ Rose, *Fragm.*, p. 79; Diog. Laert. 2, 46.

⁸ Rose, *Fragm.*, p. 79; fragment 76.

⁹ Hirzel, *op. cit.*, p. 289.

IV. THEOPHRASTUS

Various sources¹ reveal Theophrastus as the chief disciple of Aristotle. His interest was mainly scientific, but even in science he strove to complete and substantiate the principles of his master, and introduced no radical differences.² As Boethius bears witness, he advanced further than Aristotle in fields which the master had but slightly touched; otherwise he accepted his teachings.³ In the same place Boethius tells us that Theophrastus sometimes used the very words of Aristotle without change.⁴ Cicero, indeed, points out that Theophrastus was more accurate in his observations, and especially developed research in natural sciences.⁵ Cicero also thought Theophrastus a closer follower of the master than other Peripatetics, while Galen seems almost never to find any difference between them.⁶

Zeller points out that Theophrastus investigated the psychological effect of music and held that certain diseases could be healed by it.⁷ The few fragments we possess of this discussion lead us to believe that neither did he differ widely from Aristotle in his theory of art.

There is in Athenaeus an extract from Theophrastus "On Comedy."⁸ Zeller, however, holds that his citations from it are "quite incredible."⁹ Whether we have here a mistake of Athenaeus or not, does not seriously affect the authenticity of the aesthetic theory of Theophrastus as a practical reproduction of Aristotle's. Athenaeus may have been familiar with the *Poetics*, as he evidently was with *On Poets*,¹⁰ yet both the reference of 13, 608 E and that of 6, 261 D may have been derived from some intermediary historical discussion.

The canon of the works of Theophrastus is extremely uncertain since almost all of them, except some in natural science, are lost but for a few fragments. The list of Diogenes gives him a work on comedy,

¹ Zeller, *op. cit.*, ii, p. 348.

³ Diels, *Ueber das dritte Buch*, p. 26.

² *Op. cit.*, ii, p. 355.

⁴ Zeller, *op. cit.*, ii, p. 356.

⁵ Cicero, *Fin.*, 5, 4, 10.

⁶ Shute, *op. cit.*, p. 26.

⁷ Zeller, *op. cit.*, ii, pp. 415, 416.

⁸ G. Kaibel, ed. *Athenaei Naucratis Dipnosophistarum, libri XV*, vols. i, ii, Leipzig, 1887, 6, 261 D (p. 81), and 8, 348 A (i, p. 263).

⁹ Zeller, *op. cit.*, ii, p. 414, and n. 4.

¹⁰ Vahlen, *op. cit.*, p. 6, n. on *Poetics*, 1. 1447 B 21.

and one on the ridiculous, but two separate works on poetics.¹ This last statement may have been a mere repetition on the part of a scribe or librarian, but it is especially noted in the list that the second is another work. Andronicus and Hermippus both drew up lists. One, probably by Hermippus, is preserved by Diogenes, but it follows a curious order, having first two alphabetical lists, of which the second probably supplements the first. These perhaps show the contents, at different times, of some great library such as the Alexandrine. They are in turn followed by a list without order, and a fourth division in the main alphabetical. The genuineness of most of the works is beyond our means of knowledge, but Usener thinks that some were rather the writings of Eudemus.²

Although Cicero says that Theophrastus passes over slightlying what Aristotle had treated already,³ yet he did treat the same topics as Aristotle,⁴ and probably reviewed the whole of the Aristotelian philosophy as head of the Peripatetic school. It is, therefore, almost certain that he would exactly reproduce the master's doctrine in a subject in which he was apparently less original than he was in natural sciences. Rose shows that the evidence of Cicero and Proclus proves that the dialogues of Theophrastus were written in the same manner as those of Aristotle.⁵ Plutarch, whose *Consolatio*, it will be remembered, contains the passage without hiatus, perhaps taken word for word from a dialogue of Aristotle, quotes Theophrastus on Fate, and while this quotation is short, it is in precisely the same style as the Aristotelian quotation.⁶ Thus it is probable that Theophrastus imitated his master as far as writing a dialogue on poetics or poets, although we are unable to tell if one of the works mentioned in the list of his writings corresponds to such a work. Fragments of Theophrastus on the question of comedy and tragedy, therefore, not found in our *Poetics*, might well have been in Aristotle's dialogue *On Poets*.

¹ Diogenes Laertius, *De vitis*, 5, 36, p. 294, ed. 1692.

² Zeller, *op. cit.*, ii, p. 352, n. 4.

³ Cicero, *Fin.*, 1, 2, 6.

⁴ Cicero, *Div.*, 2, 1, 3.

⁵ Rose, *Fragm.*, p. 23.

⁶ F. Wimmer, *Theophrasti Eresii opera quae supersunt omnia*, vol. iii, Leipzig, 1862, p. 181 (fragment 73).

There is, indeed, a definition of tragedy ascribed by Diomedes to Theophrastus.¹ Zeller objects to it on the ground that it is not elaborate enough,² an objection which Reich meets by characterizing it as a popularization of Aristotle's teaching.³ This is possible, but the popularization does not need to have been original with Theophrastus. It was much more probably the definition in the dialogue *On Poets* that Theophrastus reproduced. It does not conflict with the conception of the nature of tragedy which underlies that of the dramatic species in the *Poetics*, and, as Margoliouth points out, Aristotle's own equivalent for the word *σπουδαῖος* found in *Poetics* 6 is the word *heroic* of Theophrastus' definition.⁴ Von Christ, indeed, rated this latter definition higher than that of the *Poetics*, and declared it more correct on the ground that, in the definition of *Poetics* 6, the religious factor was omitted, and the discussion limited to an ethical and political treatment.

There are three other definitions of dramatic species including comedy, parallel to that of tragedy in Diomedes,⁵ and critics have ascribed them all to Theophrastus.⁶ If this supposition is correct, it is probable, as Reich asserts, that all four were derived from Aristotle.⁷ How they came to Diomedes is uncertain, but Koett conjectures that they survived in some compendium.⁸

Although no certain proof can be offered, it is an interesting possibility that the source of Theophrastus was the dialogue *On Poets*, and it may be possible even more definitely to locate the definition of tragedy there. It has been shown by the work of Finsler that there is a close relation between the dialogue and Plato, and there is abundant evidence of his contention. Plato asserted that Empedocles was not, properly speaking, a poet, and with this Aristotle agrees both in the fragment of his dialogue *On Poets* and in the *Poetics*.

¹ Keil, *Grammatici Latini*, i, p. 487 of *Diomedis de oratione*, Liber iii; von Christ, *Geschichte*, i, pp. 248, 249.

² Zeller, *op. cit.*, ii, p. 414, n. 4.

³ Reich, *op. cit.*, i, p. 267.

⁴ Margoliouth, *Poetics*, p. 44.

⁵ M. Schanz, *Geschichte der römischen Litteratur*, Munich, 1904, IV. 1, p. 153.

⁶ Reich, *op. cit.*, i, p. 266.

⁷ *Op. cit.*, i, p. 270.

⁸ E. Koett, *op. cit.*, p. 47.

Empedocles is furthermore contrasted with Homer by Plato, and by Aristotle in the *Poetics* and *On Poets*. Aristotle in the *Poetics* connects Homer closely with the subject of tragedy, and most of his illustrations are chosen from the epic. Plato, indeed, made Homer the greatest of poets in tragedy. Now it appears probable that Aristotle brought Homer and Socrates together in the third book, perhaps in showing, against Plato, that the two highest species of poetry, tragedy and epic, possessed in a high degree the generalizing or genuinely philosophic merit of poetry. Thence it becomes very probable that the fundamental idea of the nature of tragedy set forth in the *Poetics* and concisely expressed in the Theophrastian definition, which yet agrees with Plato and all ancient critical conceptions, would have entered into the discussion at this point, and may have been expressed in the very words of Theophrastus which are reproduced by Diomedes. The Theophrastian definition would then have been found in the third book of the dialogue *On Poets*.